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BEBE JORGENSEN, Appellant, v. EARLE 14. JORGENSEN, Respondent.
[1] Judgment&-Eqwtable :&el1et-Fraud.-Equitable relief from a
judgment will be denied where it ill sought to re1itigate an ilsue
involved in the former proceeding on the ground that allega·
tions or proof of either party was fraudulent or based on mis·
take, but luch relief may be granted if the party seeking it wal
precluded by fraud or the miltake trom participating in the proeeeding or trom fully presenting hia case.
.
Equitable Beliet - Fraud. - In determining whether a
party is entitled to equitable relief trom a judgment on the
ground of fraud, it iI necessary to examine the facts in the light
of the policy that a party who failed to assemble all his evidence
at the trial eould not be privileged to relitigate a caee, ae well
as the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a tair ad·
Tersary proceeding in whieh fully to present hia C&Be.

[2] ld. -

[S] IA.-Equitable BeUet-Fraud-Acta Oonstituting.-The policy
permitting equitable relief from a judgment applie8 when a
party'l adversary, in violation of a duty arising from a trust
or confidential relation, hae concealed from him facts 88sential
to the protection ot hia rights, even though luch tacta con·
cerned iaauel involved in the caee in which the judgment wu
entered.
[4] Divorce-Judgments-BeUef from Fraudulent DecreeL-Th,
policy permitting a party to seek equitable relief from a judg·
ment entered in a proceeding in which he wa.~ deprived of a
fair opportunity fully to present his case, applies to judgments
in divorce caees approviDg and adopting property .ettlement
agreements.

Judgments - BeUef from Fraudulent Decrees. - The breach
of fiduciary duty of a hueband in concealing community property aHets in connection with a property settlement agreement
deprives the wife of an opportunity to protect her rights in the
concealed aeseta and warrantl equitable relief from a judgment
approving the agreement.

[5] Ill. -

Lil See 15 Oal.Jur. 14; 81 Am.Jur. 228.
KcX. Dig. Beferences: [I, 2] Judgmenta, IllIi1; [a] 11Ic1p..te,
1251(4); [H] Divorce, 1117(1).
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[6] Id,-··Judgments-Relief from Fraudulent Decrecs.- A wi!',',·
action to set aside portion" of an interlocutury rliYorce dccl'<'p
approving a property settlement on the ground of fraud is
barred by the admission in her complaint that she lind her at·
torney did not investignt'.' the facts, bnt chose instead to rely
on the statenJents of the husband that certain assels were his
separate property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to set aside provisions of an interlocutory divorce
judgment relating to a property settlement agreement. Judgment for defendant on the pleadings, affirmed.
Mitchdl, Silberberg & Knupp, Guy Knupp and Peery
Price for Appellant.
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers and Pierce Works
for Respondc~lt..
TRAYNOR, J.-The parties were married in 1924. Tht.y
separated in 1944 and executed a property settlement agreement providing that following tl1f~ir divorce the husband
would pay the wife $30,000 annually for her support and
that of their .-:hildren. The wife thereafkr brought an acti{)ll for
divorce in which the husband made no appearance. Hhe 'IL·
ta:'n,:<1 Il:l interlocutory decree in which thl' propert:. selth!ment agre('ment was approved and adopted, and a final decree
wa:; subse(lnentl~' entered. !. n the present action plaintiff seeIn;
to sd asirle the provisions of the interlocutory decree relating"
to the property settlement agreemcnt, on the grounds of fraud
or mistakt'. She allegcd in her amended complaint that some
,'f the asr;(:is listed in the agreement as separate property of
the· hllshafill were cOl1lmunity property and that defendant
pr.:>cnrcd her consent to the a~reelllent by fraudulentl;:r- representing those assets as hi,; separate property. Plaintiff
fnrther alleged that she and the attorney who represented J:~r
wh( n the propf'rt~· settlellleut agreement was n~ade, relying
exelusivdy upon defeudant's representations, (!id not investigate whether the assets in question were cOlllClUnity or
separate prfJperty_ Plaintiff alleged as all alternative cause
of act:on that defendant made his representatiolls by mistake
upou the advice of his COU!H;(,l.
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'l'he agrcC'n1C'nt recites that it "is based upon a full disclosure of aU real and prr.~fJllal pl'(lJlC'rtics and shall constitute
n final settlC'ment, adjust1l1ent <llld d i Yi~i(lll of t lIP JlroJ)(>rt~· and
the financial mat.t.ers of the part.il's." PJllintifl' aJl,':!\'S that
she consented to this statemcnt and was satisficl1 with the
contract because she was persllaclrrl b~' the rl'presC'ntations of
defendant that under the Ilgrct'1\H'nl she received half the
commudty property; that defendant had exclush'e control
and mauagement of the property of the parties throughout
their married life and was therefore aware that the pr,.perty
listed in the agreement as his separat.e property was community property; that she was not . familiar with the facts,
since she was preoccupied with her duties as housewife and
mother; that in making the agreE'ment an~ snbmitting it to
the conrt she relied on defendant's honesty and the truthfulness of his representations: ar.d that the attorney who represented her in the negotiations with respeet to the property
settlement agreement anll had previously represented her in
the negotiations with respect toa voting trust a~reement with
defendant was recommended to her by defendant, who paid
the fee for his services.
In his answer defendant demed that the propcrty sdtlement
agreement classified as his separate property any assets in
which the wife had a community interest or that he made
false repre.o:;entations regarding an~' assets mentioned in the
agreement. He also filed a cross-complaint praying that his
title to the assets in question be qnieted. At thc trial defendnut r.bjected to the introdnction of any "vidence by plaintiff,
on the ground that her amended complnint was insnfilcient to
state a cause of action. The court sl1stained this oujection,
and after dcfend:mt had introduced into evidence thl.' property
settlement agreement and thc intcrlocutory and final decree
of divorce, entered a judglllCnt for dcfendnnt on the complaint
and cross-complaint.
Since the court entered judgment on t.he pleadings with
respect to plaintiff's amended complaint, it must be assumed
for the purposes of this appeal thnt the allegations therein
are true. With regard to the parthion of ihe community
property plaintiff alleged that before the property 8E'ttlement
agreement was executed, the parties n~reed thilt each was to
receiw ha.lf the community property And that defendant
represented to her that the agreement, drafted· by his at-

)
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torneys, gave her half the community property, whereas
actually it depriv~d her of her community property interest
in certain shares of stock, namely, half the outstanding stock
of the Earle M. Jorgenscll Company (hereaftcr referred to
as Jorgensen Company) and all the ontstanding stock of the
Earle M. Jorgensen-Forge Division (hereafter referred to as
Forge Division).
It appears frOID the amended complaint that the outstanding stock of the .Jorgensen Company consists of 1,000 shares,
500 of which were reprcsclJted h.\' certificate No. 14 and 500
by certificate No. lri at the time the property settlement
agreement WUi:; cxc(:uted. Defendant owned the 500 share!>
represented by certificate No. 14 before his marriage to plaintiff. He acquired the GOO shares represented by certificate
No. 15 from his formcr partner in 1927. approximately three
years after the mnrriflge. TJwreafter defendant remained the
sole manager of the corporati.on. According to the terms of
the property settlemcnt agreement the parties in 1943 "entered into a voting trust agreer:J.ent pursuant to which said
one thousand (1,000) shar0s were to be held and are now
held by the Hnsband as voting trustee. Prior thereto, said
five hundred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 14
were the sole and separate property of the husband, and said
five hundred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 15
were community property of the parties. Said voting trust
agreement provides that the beneficial interests under such
trust shall be held by the parties in the same manner as said
shares were owned by them immediately prior to the creation
of said trust . . . . The parties h~reby confirm the said beneficial interest is held and owned hy them in suid manner, and
that upon termination of snid voting trnst said five hundred
(500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 14 will be owned
by the Hushand as his separate property, and said five hundred (500) shares evidenced by Certificate No. 15 will be
held and owned by the parties as community property."
The property settlement agreement also provided that" In
the event that either party shall at any time hereafter obtain
8 final decree of divorce from the other, but not otherwise,
the following provisions of this paragraph shall become and
shall thereafter remain effective . . . . The 500 shares of
Earle ~I. Jorgensen Company evi(lenced by Certificate No.
]4. alld Olw-half of the !iOO shares of said corporation evidenced by Certificate No. 15 shall be the sole and separate

May 1940 I
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property of the Husband, and the othcr one-half of said 500
shares evidcnced by Certificate No. 15 shall be the sole and
separate property of the Wife . . . . " Plaintiff alleges, however, that the 500 sharf's represented by certificate No. 14 and
designated in the agreement as separate property had a value
not exceeding $55,000 when the parties married and had only
slightly increased in value when in 1927 defendant acquired
the other 500 shares and became the sole manager of the corporation; that these shares were worth more than $1,000,000
when the parties executcd the property settlement agrcement;
and that this incrcase in value was primarily a result of defendant's skill and industry in managing the corporation.
She contends therefore that these 500 shares were largely
community property at the time of the property settlement
agreement.
As to the shares of the Forge Division, plaintiff alleges
that this corporation was organized in 1942 with an authorized
capital stock of 1,000 shares, each with a par value of $100,
of which only three shares were issued, and that these shares
were acquired by defendant with community property funds;
that they werp worth $300 when the corporation was organized but that by the timt' the property settlement agreement was expcnted their yalue had been augmented to $175,000
by thp skill and industry of defendant as manager of the
corporation. Plaintiff contends that these shares were therefore entirely community property when the property settlement agreement was executed and that it was through the
fraud of defendant that the property settlement agreement
provides that" All shares of Earle M. Jorgensen Co.-Forgc
Division, a California corporation, standing in the name of
the husband ... are his sole and separate property."
Plaintiff contends that the part of the interlocutor;>" decree
approving and adopting the property settlement agreement
was induced by defendant's false representations and that
they constitute extrinsic fraud or mistake entitling her to
equitable relief from the decree. Defendant on the other
hand contends that if he perpetrated any fraud it was intrinsic and there can be no equitable relief from the decree.
Plaintiff relies on Taylor Y. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 79 [218 P.
756, 51 A.L.R. 1074], and Milekovich v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App .
.537 [181 P. 256]. Defendant relies on Howard v. Howard,
27 Ca1.2d 319 [163 P .2d 439]. The cases relied on by plain-
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hrJd that equitable relit·f from a divorce decrec approving

lind auopting a property settlelllent agrecmcnt is available

a wife if the hu<;band frn1l(1ulently secured h~r consent to
Ihe agreelllcnt by concraJillg cOllllJlIInity property :lssets, for
such concealment precludes her from esfablishing her rights
thereto. The Howard case, supra, held that a husband was
not entitled to equitable relicf from the provisions of a divorce
decree approving and adopting a property settlemcnt agrcement upon the allegation that he entered into the agreemrnt
in reliance upon representations of his wife that she was a
faithful wife and mother, whereas during coverture and before
the execution of the agreement she had repeatedly committed
adultery. In that case it was determined that by submitting
1he property settlement agreement to the court the issue as
to its fairness had been tendered in the divorce action and
that therefore the alleged fraud perpetrated by the wife was
intrinsic to the issues involved in the divorce action and should
have been guarded against at the trial thereof. Defendant
contends that by the same reasoning the fraud alleged in the
cases on which plaintiff relies was intrinsic.
Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074]
and Milclco1)ick v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App. 537 [181 P. 256) as
well as Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319 [163 P.2d 439),
recognize that when equitable relief from a final judgment
is sought, it makes an important difference whether the fraud
or mistake is intrinsic or extrinsic to the issues involved in
the case in which the judgment was entered. [1] The public
policy underlying the principle of res judicata that there must
be an end to litigation requires that the issues involved in a
case be set at rest by a final judgmcnt, evcn though a party
has persuaded the court or the jury by false allegations supported by perjured testimony. This policy must be considered
toge ther with the policy that a party shall not he deprived
of a fair adversary proCleeding in which fully tn present his
casco Thus. equitable relief will be denied where it is
sought to relit.igate nn issue involved in the former proceeding on the ground that allegations or proof of either party
was fraudulent or based on mistake, but such rclief may be
granted if the party seeking it was precluded by fraud or the
mistake of the other party from participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31
CaJ.2d 362. 365 1]88 P.2d 755); Howan! v. Howard. 27
Ca1.2d 319, 321 [163 P.2d 439]; Westphal v. Westphal, 20
10
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Ca1.2d 3n, 397 lI2(; P.2d 10~, I; 1,llrTII/>c/' v. 'I'rary, ~l Cal.
2<1 64~ [134 P.2d 2(j~ I ; Olil'cra v. Gra.cc, 19 Cal.2d ~70, 575
[122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328) ; Carr v. Bank of A.merica,

11 Ca1.2d 366. 371-373 [79 P.2d 1096, llG A.L.R. 1282);
Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Ca1.2d 322, 325-326 [65 P.2d 777, 113
A.L.R. 1230); Ringwalt v. Bank of A.merica, 3 Ca1.2d 680,
684-685 145 P.2d 967J ; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476479 [23 P.2d 758, 8R A.L.R. 1194) ; Tracy v. Mm'r, 151 Cal.
363, 371 [90 P. 832, 121 .A.m.St.Rep. 117] ; f>CC, Restatcment,
Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th cd.), §§ 12331235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th cd.), p. 610.)
'I'he terms" intrinsic" and "extrinsic" fraud or mistake are
g('nt,rally accepted as appropriate to describe the two different categories of cases to which these policies of the law
apply (Freeman, 1:bid., p. 2568). They do not constitute,
however, a simple and infilllible formula to determine whr,ther
in a given case the facts surrounding th(' frand or mistake
warrant equitable relief from a judgment. (Larrahce v.
Tracy, 21 Ca1.2d 645, 649 [134 P .2d 265]; sec, Frpeman,
ibid., p. 2570.) [2] It is necessary to examine the facts in the
light of the policy that a party who failed to aSi:emblf> all
his eyidl'nce at the trial should not be privilcbed to relitigate
u case, as well as the policy permitting a party to spck relief
frOID a judgment entered in a proceeding in which he was
deprived of a fair opportunity fully to present hi~ case.
(3] 'I'he latter policy applies when a party's adversary,
in "iolation of a duty arising from a trust or confidl'lltial
relation, has concealed from him facts essential to t he protection of his rights, even though such facts concerned it;sues
involved in the case in which the judgment was I'ntered.
"The failure to perform the duty to speak or make dis"losurcs which rests upon one because of a trust or confidential
relation is obviously a fraud, for \vhieh equit.y Illa;)" rcli('\'e
from a judgment thereby obtained, even though the breaeh
of duty occurs during a judieip..1 procoeding and ill'.'olves
false testimony, and this is true whether such fraud be regarded as extriusic or as an exception to t.he extrinsic fraud
ruk" (3 Pr~el1lan, Jud~llll'nts (5th cd.), p. 2576; see, Loull
Y. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347 [145 N.W. 183, 5 A.I.i.R 655].)
Iu
this state equitable relief has becn granted from final judgments settling the accouuts of guardians, administrators. or
exeeutors who withheld information that would hUVL! enahled

)
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the bellcfieiaries to attack tlkC aecounts (LataiUadr v. Orena,
91 Cul. 5Grl, 576 [27 P. 924, 23 Am.St.Rcp. 219J; Silva v.
Santos, 13H Cal. 536, 541 [71 P. 703J ; .tlldrich v. Barton, 138
Cal. 220, 223 [7] P. 169, 94 Am.St.Rep. 43 J ; Simonton \'.
Los Angeles Trust &' Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657 [221
P. 368] ; :l1organ v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182 [193 P. 288] ;
see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93 [5 S.Ct. 393, 28 L.Ed,
934] ). The same principle applies to decrees distributing
the e!5tah' of It decedent adversely to the rights of beneficiaries
who have been precluded from pursuing their rights by conceabent of facts by the fiduciary (Larrabee v. Tracy,21 Cal.
2d 645, 649 [134 P.2d 265J ; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Ca1.2d 322,
325 [65 P.2d 777, 113 A.L.R. 1230]; Campbell-l(awannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 210 [92 P. 184) ; Bacon v.
Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,490 l89 P. 317 J; 8ohlc1' v. Sohler, 135
Cal. 323 [67 p, 282, 87 Am,St.Rep. 98] ; see, Carr v. Bank of
America, 11 Ca1.2d 366, 371-374 [79 P.2d 1096, 116 A.L.R.
1282J ; RiugU:CLlt v. Bank of Arne1'ica, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684 [45
P .2d 9(j7]) and to other probate decrees obtained under
similar circumstances. (Caldwell Y. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 475
[23 P.2J 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194]; Estate of ROliS, 180 Cal. 651,
658 [182 P. 752] j Ourtis v. Schell, 129 Cal. 208,215 [61 P.
951, 79 Alll.St,Rep. 107 J ; see 23 Cal.L.Rev. 79, 83.)
[4] The same principle also applies in the cases concerning equitable relief from judgments approving and adopting
property settlemellt agreements relied on by plaintiff. In
MilekOV'ich v. Quinn, 40 Cal.App. 537 [181 P. 256], the wife
alleged in u divorce action that her husband held securities
worth sixty-thousand dollars, which were community property. The husband denied her allegation, stating in his answer and ill an affidavit filed in reply to an application of the
wife for alimony pendente lite that the sec1lriti!'s held by
him were worth not more than two thousand dollars. Relying
on these representations, the wife entered into a property
settlemellt agreement specifying the community property assets
that she was to receive and providing that thL' husband should
receive the remainder of the community property. The agreement was approved and adopted by the court ill an interlocutory divorce decree. The wife sought equitable relief
from the provisions of the decree relating to the agreement,
since the husband had concealed from her bonds in the par
valu!' of forty-five-thousand dollars acquired with community
property funds, which be had withdrawn from his safe-

May 1948]
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deposit box and delivered to a custodian after thE' commencellIent of the divorce action;
In Taylor v. 7'aylor, 192 Cal. 71 [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R.
1074], the wife entered into a property settlement agreement
wherein she released all obligations of the husband as to support and alimony and disclaimed all her rights to community
property ill consideration of the payment of $500 to her by
the husband. She sought equitable relief from a divorce decree approving and adopting this agreement, on the ground
that the husband had concealed from her the existence of
certain real property acquired with community property funds
placing it in the name of his brother.
[6] As the manager of the community property the husband occupies a position of trust (Civ. Code, §§ 172-173,158),
which is not terminated as to assets remaining in his hands
when the spouses separate. It is part of his fiduciary duties
to account to the wife for the community property when the
spouses are negotiating a property settlement agreement.
The concealment of community property assets by the husband
from the wife iu connection with such an agreement is therefore a breach of a fiduciary duty of the husband that deprives
the wife of an opportunity to protect her rights in the concealed assets aud thus warrallts equitable relief from a judgment approving SUCll agreement. "~hell community property
is entrusted to the wife, she likewise occupies a position of
trust. It has therefore been held that a husband may obtain
equitable relief from a divorce dE'cree incorporating a property
settlement agreement obtained by the fraud of the wife in
concealing community assets entrusted to her control. (Boullester v. Superior Cou.rt, 137 Cal.App. 193, 195 [30 P.2d
59].) It is immaterial whether the husband or the wife has
submitted the property settlement to the conrt for approyal;
thE' fraud of one spouse in concealing the assets, if not discovered by the other, precludes the latter from protecting
his or her rights as to the concealed assets in the divorce proceeding.
Howard v. Howard, 27 CaJ.2d 319 [163 P.2d 439], is
clearly distinguishable from thl'se cases, for ill that ease the
husband did not allege that the wife pl'oellred the property
settlement agreement by cOlH'ealillg iufol'lllatioll in violation
or a fiduciary duty of disclosure. Her alleged fraud related
to acts of adultery, which she was under no fiduciary duty

22
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to disclose, for those acts constitut.ed a gronnd for divorce.
ThE' law imposes upon a spouse seeking a divorce t.he burden
of proving facts const.ituting a statut.ory ground for divorce
and of presenting corroboration of his own testimony or of
admissions of the other spouse. (Civ. Code, § 130 i Code Civ.
Proc., § 2079; Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Cal. 746, 748 [154 P. 8371 ;
Deyoe v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal. 476,483 [74 P. 28, 98 Am.
St.Rep. 73] i see also, Civ. Code, § 132; Grannis v. Superior
Oourt, 146 Cal. 245, 248 [79 P. 891, 106 Am.St.Rep. 23].)
If failure to reveal grounds for divorce warranted equitable
relief from divorce judgments, the stability of such judgments
and titles to property thereunder would be seriously imperiled.
[6] The issue in the present case is whether under the
facts stated in her amended complaint, the wife was deprived
of a fair opportunity to submit her case fully to the court
because of a breach of a fiduciary duty of the husband. There
is no allegation in the complaint that defendant concealed
assets that were part of the community property. The assets
were disclosed, and the complaint is based on the theory that
defendant fraudulently claimed certain community property
as his separate estate. The classification of property as separate or community is frequently difficult. A husband at
the time of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his separate
property assets that a court might hold to be community
property. Confronted with the assertion by the husband that
certain assets are his separate property the wife must take
her own position and if necessary investigate the facts.
(Ohampion v. Woods, 79 Cal. 17, 20 [21 P. 534, 12 Am.St.
Rep. 126]; Dowling v. Spring Valley Water 00., 174 Cal.
218,222 [162 P. 894] ; Haviland v. Southern Oalifornia Edison
00., 172 Cal. 601, 609 [158 P. 328] ; see, Brown v. Brown,
170 Cal. 1,5 [147 P. 1168] ; Lindley v. Hinch, 57 Cal.App.2d
717,719 [135 P.2d 421].) If the wife and her attorney are
satisfied with the husband's classificatiorl of the property as
separate or communit~·. the wife cannot reasonably contend
that fraud was committed or that there was snch mistake as
to allow her to overcome the finality of a judgment. In the
present case plaintiff alleged that she and her attorney relied exclusively on her hnsband's representations that the shares in
question were his separate property and that her attorney
made no examination or investigation to ascertain whether
the shares were cOlllmunity property. She did not allege that

)
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hcr attorney intclltiollally fail<'d tn pruteet her interests.
Plaiutiff is barred fr0111 obtaining equitable relief by her admission that she anu hrr attorJwy did not investigate the
facts, choosing instead to rely 011 the statements of the husband as to what part of the disclosed property was community
property.
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 24,
1948.

